for Security Drivers and Solo Practitioners
The Ground Truth
When it comes to executive/close protection the debate as to what constitutes effective protection has raged on for at least the three decades since I first entered the field, and likely much longer. Some will say with absolute certainty and conviction that a single protection practitioner simply cannot keep another individual safe from harm. If one relies on the widely accepted definition of the protection practitioner’s primary goal – keeping the Principal safe from harm and embarrassment – then clearly that opinion doesn’t withstand the test of time nor the reality of the world most practitioners work in. The reality is that across much of the world, most certainly in low to moderate risk environments or circumstances, literally thousands of Principals are being protected – i.e., shielded from harm or embarrassment – by a single practitioner, day in and day out. To say that such an approach isn’t workable ignores the fact that if it were not possible to effectively protect someone in this manner, the headlines would be filled with horrific stories of violence and mayhem being visited upon those who had the extraordinary misfortune of being looked after by a Solo Practitioner. But even in today’s uncertain times, they’re not and, in fact, never have been filled with such tales.
In reality, quite the opposite holds true. Some of the most infamous (and ultimately successful) attacks against high-profile public figures have targeted Principals with large protection details. Now, that is certainly not to say that those whose daily routines play out in high-risk environments, or those facing serious, imminent, and credible threats of violence, should ignore the fact that one-on-one protection is not the optimum approach in those circumstances. Those who would certainly do so at the risk of contributing to their own misfortune; conversely, those who advocate a high profile, multi-practitioner presence in circumstances where the risk doesn’t warrant it, do so at their own professional peril.
As to whether or not such an approach meets some professional standard, once again the reality is that such a standard does not yet exist, and if at some point a standard was to come about that does not recognize this common approach to low-to-moderate risk protection, one which is codified in Federal regulations via IRS Part 1.132-5 (the only absolute requirements to demonstrate an overall security program exists as defined in paragraph (m), sub-paragraph (2)(iii)(A) are “a bodyguard/chauffeur trained in evasive driving techniques” and “an automobile specially equipped for security”), it’s likely that it would not be taken seriously by a large swath of major corporations, HNW/UHNW Family Offices, and others who have successfully utilized Solo Practitioner model for decades.
Having said all of that and, again, recognizing that while the Solo Practitioner approach – where one protection practitioner is responsible for managing the wide range of risks their Principal may face – is not the optimum approach to doing so, it is in fact being effectively implemented far more often and successfully than many in the profession would care to admit, it’s worthwhile to take a closer look at the strategies and tactics which contribute to the effectiveness of the Solo Practitioner paradigm. Arguably the most valuable among those strategies and tactics being surveillance detection; however, in the context of one-on-one protection, the emphasis must be placed on integrating surveillance detection strategies and tactics into the Solo Practitioner’s suite of skills, as opposed to relying on other personnel dedicated to performing surveillance detection. Of course, one should never turn down assistance, especially in such a critical facet of protection, but the ground truth is that most professional Security Drivers/Solo Practitioners won’t have that luxury.
What to Look For
The obvious answer to the question of exactly what it is that the Security Driver or Solo Practitioner should be looking for when he or she is conducting surveillance detection is surveillance or, more accurately, indicators and warning signs of potential surveillance activity. For most folks, if their imagination is allowed to run wild, what constitutes those indicators or warnings signs could quickly morph from what is most probable or likely into mental images of helicopters hovering above, black-clad figures rappelling off of rooftops, and hotel rooms packed with sophisticated long-range listening devices and cameras equipped with enormous telephoto lenses. That is not to say that it isn’t remotely possible that an adversary will go to such lengths to get “eyes on” their target; equipped with enough time, money, and imagination, anything is possible, no matter how remote that possibility may actually be for most practitioners and their Principals.
For most professional Security Drivers, Solo Practitioners, and their counterparts on the close protection side of the house, it’s far more likely that the surveillance signature of their adversary will be much more benign and, therefore, at least in some respects more difficult to detect. And the more experienced an adversary becomes at performing surveillance, and the more familiar they become with the routines and habits of the Principal and those protecting them, the harder it may become to detect their intelligence gathering activities; which is, of course, the purpose of surveillance and why it has been a tactical imperative for the adversary to conduct surveillance on their intended targets since the dawn of time. Or, when it comes to secure transportation operations, since at least 218 A.D. when Emperor Qin Shi Huang’s would-be assassin took a job as a construction laborer on his palace grounds in order to observe his comings and goings.
Seeing is Believing
Hovering helicopters, people rappelling down buildings and the like are certainly examples of macro indicators. But, as mentioned earlier, the average practitioner or driver is more likely to have to look closer and harder for even the macro indicators of surveillance, let alone the micro indicators. Even when the adversary is inexperienced there is not necessarily one indicator that screams out to even the most experienced SD operative “hey, look at me, I am looking at your Principal … on purpose”. Rather, it is a combination of observations and the circumstances within which those observations are being made that provides a clearer picture that someone may be deliberately observing their Principal. This is what makes things challenging for the driver or practitioner who can only focus their attention on surveillance detection for short periods of time. They have to identify potential indicators and warning signs of hostile surveillance without having had the luxury of time to become intimately familiar with their surroundings, the level or patterns of activity, vehicle, and pedestrian traffic patterns, and the like.
So, with that in mind, what the guy or gal who is behind the wheel as they roll up to their Principal’s favorite restaurant – where they have a standing reservation for the same day and same time of day every week – is looking for are COPPs. What this acronym stands for is:
Context
Any adversary worth his or her salt is certainly not going to be hiding behind a potted plant or peering around the corner of a building in an attempt to catch a glimpse of their target. Instead, they will do their best to hide in plain sight, sitting, standing, or even moving on foot, in a specific location that affords them a line of sight to their target. Oftentimes, the only indicator that they are not who or what they appear to be is provided by what they are not doing as opposed to what they are doing. For example, someone sitting at a table outside of a coffee shop with a cup of coffee and a scone – a solid $8 or $10 dollar investment these days – who hasn’t taken a sip or bite of either since they sat down may the person performing surveillance. While this example may be overly simplified, it intended to help the driver or practitioner understand the level of situational awareness and attention to detail that needs to be maintained when engaging in surveillance detection.
Orientation
Picking out the person (or people) who may be conducting surveillance at any given location has as much to do with where they are positioned relative to their target as it does with what they are, or are not, doing. For the adversary, maintaining an uninterrupted line of sight is the objective, but most times the specific places that they can achieve this from are limited by the natural and man-made terrain within their environment, which acts to channelize them toward some specific points within that environment.
Building off of the previous example of the adversary outside of the coffee shop, while there may be ten tables in front of the shop, based on the terrain and the flow of the Principal’s movements there may be just three that provide the adversary an uninterrupted line of sight to their target. If out of those three:
- one is occupied by a couple who are sitting across from one another, but perpendicular to the street, which would force them to crane their necks to maintain a line of sight to their target,
- another is occupied by three young men who are having a rather boisterous argument over last night’s game, while intermittently flirting with their waitress and some girls sitting at an adjacent table,
- and the third table is occupied by a lone man sitting in the chair that allows him to face the street (and the target), who happens to have a cup of coffee and a scone in front of him which he has not touched since the waitress set them on the table,
then the most logical conclusion that the driver or practitioner might reach is that the lone gentleman may – with a strong emphasis on the word may – be engaged in surveillance. Or he may just be a guy who likes his coffee cold, his scones stale, and admires the fountain in front of the building which the Principal’s car just pulled up in front of.
Parallel Patterns
At the risk of generalizing or over-simplifying things, by its very nature surveillance is reactive, which works in favor of those who are trying to detect it. This is because the movements of the Principal determine where the adversary is most likely going to focus their surveillance efforts on, and when they are most likely to do so. Therefore, when it comes to predictable locations, such as that restaurant where the Principal has a standing reservation, the surveillance will need to be in place prior to the Principal’s arrival and, quite possibly, through the departure of the Principal.
Additionally, the Principal’s movements or, in the eyes of the adversary the movements of the target, within a given environment may make it necessary for those performing surveillance to move with, or as, the target does. Staying with the current example just a moment longer, if the driver moves the vehicle around the block to the rear exit of the restaurant, that would likely force whoever was observing from outside the coffee shop to relocate to a new point that will provide a line of sight to the vehicle and that rear exit. In doing so, the adversary has created a pattern of movement that parallels the movements of the target. They have also provided the driver or practitioner with a direct line of sight to themselves…for a second time at that same general location.
Just a Quick Glimpse
As with most other aspects of providing protection, there is much more to surveillance detection than meets the eye, or that can be conveyed in a single article. Given the limited courses of action available to the professional Security Driver/Solo Practitioner should he or she be confronted by an attempt to cause harm to their Principal expanding their knowledge and capability in this critical skill set should be an ongoing priority. As Tony Scotti, a pioneer in the field of security driving, secure transportation, and solo practitioner protection, has said for many years now, surveillance detection isn’t just the best protection a practitioner may have against an adversary determined to attack their principal it may be the only protection.
About the Author
Joseph Autera is the President & CEO of Vehicle Dynamics Institute, one of the world’s leading providers of highly advanced training for professional Security Drivers, Solo Practitioners, and other protection practitioners.
His career in the security profession spans three decades, in which he has planned, managed, and participated in security operations in moderate and high-risk environments, and trained thousands of private sector security, law enforcement, and government/military professionals in the art and science of security driving, surveillance detection, and secure transportation operations, in 55 countries on 6 continents. He is also the author of the highly acclaimed international bestselling book Planning, Managing, and Providing Secure Transportation, from which portions of this article were excerpted.
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