A holistic View on What Matters – and When it Matters Most
Part III of a IV Part Series
In this third installment of the Science of Driver Training series, we will take a closer look at another facet of the Security Driver Triangle, the Vehicle. As was the case with our last installment in this series, which focused on the driver as a vital component of that model, we will be examining the vehicle in terms of the role it plays in not just allowing students to achieve a defined performance standard but, more importantly, how training with the most appropriate vehicles is crucial when it comes to developing sustainable, repeatable, and applicable skill and ability. So, with that in mind, the training environment will once again provide the context for closely examining the vehicle and its rapidly evolving relationship to the other components of the Triangle; in particular, the driver.
The Vehicle
It’s abundantly clear in terms of the performance standard which Tony Scotti introduced to protection-related training – whereby students are required to demonstrate the ability to use 80% or more of a given vehicle’s performance potential – that the vehicle is a vital component of the Security Driving Triangle. However, a simple fact which is often overlooked is that while all three components of the Triangle are critical to achieving that objective standard, in the modern age of Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) the type of vehicle one trains it takes on even added significance. In fact, for the protection practitioner who is investing his or her hard-earned money in bettering themselves through training, the reality is that to gain the most benefit the vehicles they train in should be of the same class of vehicle (i.e. full-size sedan, full-size SUV, etc.), be of similar design (i.e. independent rear suspension, comparable power-to-weight ratio) and, at a minimum, be equipped with Anti-lock Braking System (ABS), Traction Control (TC) and, perhaps most importantly, Electronic Stability Control (ESC).
To do otherwise is to risk learning techniques that may make it more difficult for the driver to manage the limited time, distance, and maneuvering space that are the common elements of behind-the-wheel emergencies. In the worst-case scenario, training in outdated vehicles may lead to students developing default responses (often referred to as “muscle memory”) that actually increase the risks which they and their Principals may face in a potential crash or security-related incident. Just one glaring example of this can be found in the training and application of a legacy braking technique known as threshold braking. This technique, which bled over into the security driver training realm from the world of auto racing decades ago, trains a driver to avoid engaging the vehicle’s ABS – a system which has been scientifically proven to be far more efficient and effective at bringing a vehicle to a stop than any technique which relies solely on the driver’s ability to engage the brake pedal with his or her foot – by making minute inputs on the pedal, often variations of just hundredths of an inch, to find the point just before the ABS engages. From a technical standpoint, that is indeed when the brakes are operating at their peak efficiency, but the finite control required to find that threshold is far easier to perform in a training environment, under ideal conditions specifically intended to allow the technique to work as advertised, then it is under real-world conditions, where variables such as time, distance, maneuvering space, closing speed, etc. are far less predictable, and the driver’s motor skills are rapidly degrading due to the effects of stress.
Evidence of the shortcomings of this technique can be found in a test that we – we being VDI – performed in support of the Omar Garcia Harfuch case study and analysis currently being compiled by Tony Scotti. In that test, which utilized a full size, B6 armored SUV equipped with ABS, ESC, and TC, the most experienced among the group of five test drivers that performed the test – an individual who extensive training on various braking techniques to include threshold braking, who had a number of years of experience training drivers in armored SUVs as well as in the threshold braking technique, and who had driven armored SUVs while deployed on overseas PSD operations, was unable to bring the vehicle to a stop utilizing the threshold braking technique in as short a distance as they could stop the vehicle by allowing the ABS to function as designed and intended. When comparing the stopping distance in a straight line braking exercise, in the first iteration which was performed “cold” (meaning without any practice runs), it took this highly trained, highly experienced driver 66’ more distance to stop the vehicle applying the threshold braking technique then it did for to stop the vehicle utilizing the ABS to its fullest capability. That’s just shy of three vehicle lengths more stopping distance. Eventually, after six attempts, this particular driver was able to bring the vehicle to a stop within 20 feet of what it took for the ABS to get the job done, which is still a car length longer stopping distance. And while that might not seem so bad, keep in mind that out on the street drivers only get that first “cold” shot to get it right, so the chances of even a driver highly trained and practiced in threshold braking to outperform ABS when they are confronted by a behind-the-wheel emergency are highly unlikely, to say the least.
But it’s not just braking techniques and anti-lock braking technology that today’s professional Security Driver should be concerned with when it comes to the types of vehicles that they will allow themselves to train in. With computer control units and “drive by wire” systems becoming more and more commonplace, simple tasks such as shifting from drive to reverse are likely to take more time in many modern vehicles due to the way in which the transmission controls function via “drive-by-wire” technology. In this regard, VDI’s ongoing testing regimen, which drives the continuous evolution of the content and context of our training courses, clearly demonstrates that the default responses and heuristics – a sophisticated way of describing problem-solving techniques developed through trial and error – that could readily be applied to a wide range of vehicles in the distant past when electronic transmission controls were not nearly as common as they are now, tend to significantly increase the amount of time it takes for a vehicle to start moving in reverse after coming to a dead stop. Why? Because the sensors that feed data to the transmission controller simply don’t know, nor do they care, whether you’re backing out of your driveway or trying to rapidly reverse out of a kill zone. Regardless of why the transmission has been shifted from drive to reverse, the system will not allow the vehicle to move until certain operating parameters have been met as evidenced by data outputs from the sensors in the system. And if at any point during the control system’s data acquisition cycle that data suddenly changes – for instance, because the driver rotated their foot from the brake pedal back to the throttle before the shift to reverse actually occurred and the vehicle lurched or rolled forward even the slightest amount – the controller in the system may delay the shift to reverse even longer; in some instances doubling the amount of time it takes for the transmission to actually engage reverse gear. So something as simple as getting to the gas pedal as quickly as possible and allowing the transmission to “catch up” – a technique that worked just fine on older vehicles, and one which many drivers have trained on and practiced to the point of creating muscle memory – may provide a completely different result in today’s technology-laden vehicles. As always, the time to sort that out and practice new, more effective techniques is in the training environment, the caveat being that to do so effectively one must train in vehicles that are properly equipped and with instructors who understand how these systems function, as well as what the implications are for the driver if or when those systems are activated or engaged.
The challenges that must be overcome in the training environment in order for driver training to provide value where it’s needed the most – out in the real world when the Security Driver or protection practitioner is confronted by a behind-the-wheel emergency – go well beyond how the core systems such as ABS, ESC, and TC impact a vehicle’s performance. Those challenges go beyond developing proficiency in techniques that recognize the hurdles that those systems may pose in situations where the driver must overcome limited time, limited distance, and limited maneuvering space in order to keep both their Principal and themselves safe and secure. This is particularly true when it comes to the type of vehicle one chooses to train in. Perhaps 15 years ago if it just so happened that you were driving a full-size SUV on a protective detail it might not have been an absolute necessity to train in one because the vehicle’s responses, or outputs, to the driver’s inputs were, in many ways quite similar to other types of vehicles, such as full-size sedans. This was due to the fact that regardless of what type of vehicle, before systems such as ESC and TC were as common as they are today, the onset of oversteer or understeer was, in many respects, universally recognizable and the techniques that drivers would use to manage those conditions were universally applicable as well. Thus, the techniques to manage either – or both – of those conditions were applicable to most vehicles commonly utilized for secure ground transportation. However, as the function of core and leading-edge advanced driver assistance systems have become more sophisticated and more refined, training in the type of vehicle one is or anticipates that they will be, driving in becomes less of a luxury and more of a necessity. Doing otherwise risks developing default responses to system engagement and disengagements that are far less applicable to the vehicle which the student will actually be operating then they are to the vehicle they just happened to train in. For example, the VDI team recently tested a brand new full size, luxury SUV that is one of the most common today in the secure transportation and executive protection realm; no one was more surprised than we were to discover that the vehicle’s reverse speed limiter will not allow the vehicle to exceed 5 miles an hour while driving in reverse. While there are some obvious safety benefits to limiting the “average driver” to such a slow speed, the implications for the professional driver are quite different, especially when you consider the fact that he or she is much more likely to be backing up to manage a potential threat then they are to be doing so to avoid a potential crash. If the first time the driver is exposed to that system’s limitations is during a real-world incident, their ability to effectively manage the risk they are facing is would be greatly diminished, particularly if their expectation for how the vehicle would perform under the circumstances is based on having trained in a significantly different type of vehicle. That is the sort of expectancy bias that can lead to serious consequences for the driver and /or their passengers, and that is those consequences which the professional Security Driver’s training should be preparing them to avoid or overcome as opposed to contributing to.
About the Author
Joseph Autera is the President and CEO of Vehicle Dynamics Institute, which has been carrying on the legacy Tony Scotti began in 1974 for more than 17 years. His practical experience includes freelance protection work focusing in large part on surveillance detection and secure transportation planning in semi-permissive environments in both moderate and high-risk locales as well as standing up the protective detail for a prominent technology concern. Additionally, he has also enjoyed tenures as Director of Global Security and Vice President of Global Security Operations for two different U.S. based multinational corporations. His articles on related topics have appeared in some of the professions most respected publications and he has presented on those same topics at a number of conferences and symposiums across the country.
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